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yerhaeuser, predatory
bidding, and error costs
BY KEITH

I.

N. HYLTON*

INTRODUCTION

In Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.,' the Supreme
Court held that the plaintiff in a predatory pricing lawsuit must show
that the price during the predatory campaign was cut below some relevant measure of cost and that there was a dangerous probability that
the predatory firm would recoup the losses from its predation campaign.2 Weyerhaeuser v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Co.' held that
the standard adopted in Brooke Group also applies to predatory bidding claims.
A predatory bidding campaign is a lot like a predatory pricing
campaign. Both involve a predation period, in which the predator suffers a loss in an effort to drive a rival from the market, and a recoupment period, in which the predator reaps monopoly rewards from
excluding competition. The key difference is that in the predatory bidding scenario, the predator bids up the price of an input, while in the
predatory pricing scenario, the predator cuts the price of its output.
*

Professor of Law and Paul J. Liacos Scholar, Boston University.
509 U.S. 209 (1993).

2

Id. at 222-24.

3

127 S. Ct. 1069 (2007).
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The Ninth Circuit refused to apply the Brooke Group standard to
the input market predation alleged in Weyerhaeuser on the ground
that predatory bidding was more harmful to consumers than predatory pricing.' The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit and held
that the two types of predation are "analytically similar."5
I will argue here that predatory pricing and predatory bidding
are analytically distinct in important respects.6 In particular, predatory bidding is likely to be more harmful to consumer welfare than
is predatory pricing. Successful input market predation may lead to
a "dual market power" outcome in which the firm has market
power in both the input and the output market. This potential
reward lends a stronger push to the incentive to engage in input
market predation.
In spite of the analytical distinction, I conclude that the Brooke
Group test remains the best standard to apply to predatory bidding
claims. The justification for the Brooke Group standard is based on a
balancing of expected false acquittal and false conviction costs.7 The
economic incentive arguments that indicate dissimilarities between
predatory pricing and predatory bidding do not imply that the balance of error costs should be substantially different in the two predation scenarios. In other words, the incentive arguments are not
Id. at 1973. The Ninth Circuit said that predatory bidding and predatory selling "are materially different in that predatory bidding does not necessarily benefit consumers or stimulate competition in the way that predatory
pricing does." Id.
Id. at 1076.
6
For earlier analyses of predatory pricing and predatory bidding, see
Roger D. Blair & John E. Lopatka, Predatory Buying and the Antitrust Laws, 2008
UTAH L. REV. (forthcoming 2008); John B. Kirkwood, Buyer Power and Exclusionary Conduct: Should Brooke Group Set the Standardsfor Buyer-Induced Price Discrimination and Predatory Pricing?,72 ANTITRUST L. J. 625 (2005); Steven C. Salop,
Anticompetitive Overbuying by Power Buyers, 72 ANTITRUST L. J. 669 (2005).
7 For a discussion of error costs and predation, see, e.g., KEITH N. HYL-

TON, ANTITRUST LAW: ECONOMIC THEORY AND COMMON LAW EVOLUTION

214-19

(2003). For criticism of the error-cost approach adopted in Brooke Group, see
Patrick Bolton et al., Predatory Pricing:Strategic Theory and Legal Policy, 88 GEO.
L. J. 2239, 2242-62 (2000).
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sufficient to justify replacing Brooke Group with an alternative standard that is more favorable to plaintiffs in predatory bidding cases.
I agree with the Court's conclusion, though I would have reached it
by a different route.8 Instead of stressing the analytical similarity of the
two types of predation, the Court should have put more emphasis on
the error-cost rationale and on identifying the costs of false convictions
for input market predation. Bidding for inputs happens to be a substantial path through which information held by sophisticated buyers
is communicated to prices. Convictions for predatory bidding threaten
to obstruct the transmission of private information to markets.
II.

WEYERHAEUSER: THE FACTS

Few antitrust cases have facts as simple as this one. There are two
players: Weyerhaeuser and Ross-Simmons. Both operated hardwood
lumber sawmills in the Pacific Northwest. Both purchased alder logs
on the spot market as raw material for their lumber processing businesses. The output from their lumber processing operations was sold
in the market for hardwood finished lumber. Thus, the relevant input
market for this case was alder sawlogs in the Pacific Northwest, and
the relevant output market was hardwood finished lumber.
Ross-Simmons began its operations in 1962. Weyerhaeuser entered
the same market in 1980 and became the dominant firm, accounting for
65 percent of the purchases of alder logs available in the region by 2001.
From 1998 to 2001, the price of alder logs increased while prices
for finished hardwood lumber fell. As a result, Ross-Simmons suffered losses and shut down its mill in 2001. Ross-Simmons then
brought an antitrust suit against Weyerhaeuser for unlawful monopolization in violation of section 2 of the Sherman Act. Ross-Simmons
claimed that Weyerhaeuser used its dominant position to drive up the
8 In this general sense my view of the Weyerhaeuser decision is similar to
that taken by Blair & Lopatka, supra note 6. The differences are in the details
of the arguments. Blair and Lopatka explore the economics of buyer predation in greater detail (and with more care) than I do here, which leads them to
identify weaknesses in the Court's approach. I am concerned primarily with
the error cost rationale for the Brooke Group test and that rationale's application to predatory bidding.
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prices of alder sawlogs, thereby excluding Ross-Simmons from the
(output) market in hardwood finished lumber.
After rejecting summary judgment and other motions based on
Weyerhaeuser's effort to impose the Brooke Group standard on the trial
court's analysis, the trial court eventually instructed the jury that
Ross-Simmons could prove Weyerhaeuser's bidding practices were
monopolizing if "Weyerhaeuser purchased more logs than it needed
or paid a higher price for logs than necessary in order to prevent
Ross-Simmons from obtaining the logs they needed at a fair price. '
The jury found Weyerhaeuser guilty of monopolization. Weyerhaeuser appealed to the Ninth Circuit, which affirmed the verdict on
the theory that "'buy-side predatory bidding' and 'sell-side predatory
pricing,' though similar, are materially different in that predatory bidding does not necessarily benefit consumers or stimulate competition
in the way that predatory pricing does."'" The Ninth Circuit concluded that "the concerns that led the Brooke Group Court to establish
a high standard of liability in the predatory-pricing context do not
carry over to this predatory bidding context with the same force....
III. THE COURT'S DECISION
The Court's decision in Weyerhaeuser is a simple and short rejection of the theory adopted by the Ninth Circuit. It is a mechanical
description of the reasons why the concerns that led to the Brooke
Group standard carry over to the predatory bidding context. The
Court's argument consists of the following steps: First, a brief description of the analytical similarity between input and output market predation and its recognition by antitrust scholars; second, an accounting
Weyerhaeuser, 127 S. Ct. at 1073. In his review of the 2006-2007
Supreme Court Term, Josh Wright describes this jury instruction as "disastrous." See Joshua D. Wright, The Roberts Court and the Chicago School of
Antitrust: The 2006 Term and Beyond, 3 COMPETITION POL'Y INT'L 25, 49 (2007). I
agree with Wright's assessment. Such an open-ended standard invites a jury
to apply a sense of fair play that may have been shaped by plaintiff's lawyers
rather than by a serious consideration of the economics of the case.
Wey rhaeuser, 127 S.Ct. at 1073.

Id. at 1073-74.
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of the economic similarities between predatory pricing and predatory
bidding; and finally, a peremptory statement of the reasons that the
Brooke Group standard should apply to predatory bidding. The interesting parts of the Court's argument do not appear until we get to the
second and third parts of this argument.
In the second step of this mechanical argument, the Court notes
that in both the predatory pricing and predatory bidding contexts we
observe two stages of the predation game: a predation period, in
which the dominant predator suffers losses, and then a recoupment
phase, in which the predator reaps the gains from excluding its competitors.
The Court also noted four procompetitive or efficiency motivations behind bidding up input prices or outbidding competitors: mistakes, differentiated impacts of product market demand shocks,
greater productive efficiency on the part of the dominant firm, and
2
hedging against risk.'
The mistakes could be described as instances of the "winner's
curse." 3 In a competitive bidding context, the firm that wins the contest is often the one that is most mistaken in overvaluing the asset to
be acquired. There are strategic matters that could influence the size
of the overbidding curse when the bidders are all using the asset to
compete against each other in another market. But the curse could be
observed in the absence of such strategic pressures--e.g., it could be
observed when people are bidding for houses or antiques.
The Court's second procompetitive justification is that a firm
might bid up prices to respond to increased demand for its product.
The Court may have had the differentiated products setting in mind.
In the case of homogeneous products, an increase in demand would
ordinarily affect the bidding of all participants by the same amount. A
differential effect in which one firm bids more than the other would
be observed only if the firms are not equally informed about the
demand increases or if their products are differentiated.
12

Id. at 1077.

13

See Richard H. Thaler, The Winner's Curse, 2 J. ECON.

(1988).

PERSPECTIVES

191
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The productive efficiency rationale for bidding up the price of an
input is observed in the case in which one firm is a more efficient user
of the input than is the other firm. If firm A is a more productive
processor of an input than its competitor, firm B, then the value of that
input will be greater to firm A. Firm A will therefore outbid firm B in a
spot market auction. The outbidding by firm A may have nothing to
do with any strategy on the part of A to drive B from the market.
The last procompetitive justification the Court offered for outbidding is the case in which one firm purchases an amount that appears
to be excessive as a hedge against the risk of future increases in input
costs or of input shortages. Of course, if the future cost increase or
shortage impacts all firms in the upstream market in the same manner, each should be willing to bid as much as the other. Outbidding
might be observed, however, when there is some informational asymmetry among the upstream competitors. If one firm predicts that a
shortage will occur and the other does not, the relatively pessimistic
firm will outbid its relatively optimistic competitor.
The second step of the Court's argument also includes a comparison of the benefits to consumers, during the first-stage predatory campaign, in the predatory pricing and predatory bidding settings. 4 If one
compares the input suppliers in the bidding predation market with the
consumer in the pricing predation market, the comparison would be
appropriate. In the output price predation setting, predation offers a
"boon to consumers"" as the output price is driven below the competitive level (marginal cost). In the input market, bidding predation offers
an equivalent boon to input suppliers, as input prices are driven above
competitive levels. The input suppliers in the predatory bidding context are the counterparts to the consumers in the predatory pricing
context. If a straightforward analysis of social welfare were conducted,
the same conclusions concerning the welfare effects of predatory pricing could be derived for the case of predatory bidding.
In spite of the neat analogy between consumers in the first stage
of the predatory pricing campaign and suppliers in the first stage of
I

Weyerhaeuser, 127 S. Ct. at 1077-78.

WEYERHAEUSER

: 57

the predatory bidding campaign, the Court chose to focus on ultimate
consumers in both settings. The Court relegated its discussion of the
benefits to suppliers to a footnote. 6 Having committed itself to a comparison of ultimate consumers in both settings, the Court could offer
only weak claims about the benefits predatory bidding provides to
consumers. The Court argued that since predatory bidding could take
place in a setting in which the output market is competitive, it might
occur without having any perceptible impact on consumers.
The third step of the Court's argument consists of what I have
referred to as a peremptory application of Brooke Group.7 Given the
existence of procompetitive cases in which firms are outbid by their
rivals for access to inputs, the Court held that the price-cost screen of
Brooke-Group has to be applied to predatory bidding. In addition, the
Court imposed the recoupment test on the same ground as in Brooke
Group-as an additional screen to make sure that the cases that survive summary judgment are highly likely to involve real instances of
predation.
IV. BASIC ECONOMICS OF INPUT MARKET PREDATION
As a backdrop for my discussion of the case, I should set out a few
preliminary points on the economics of input market predation and,
in particular, on the exploitation of monopoly power. After setting out
these preliminary points, I will return to the conflict between the
Ninth Circuit and the Supreme Court on the consumer welfare effects
of bidding market predation.
A. Economics of market power
In the standard output market monopoly setting, the profit-maximizing monopolist chooses an output level such that

p(l- -)
= MC,
e.

16

Id. at 1077 n.4.

17

Id. at 1078.

(1)
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where MC is the marginal cost of supplying the product, p is the
product's price, and ed is the market demand elasticity. It should be clear
from equation (1) that the monopolist sets price above marginal cost (p
> MC) and produces at an elastic portion of its demand curve (ed > 1).
Suppose the firm has market power in both the input and output
markets. The monopoly-pricing condition shown in (1) changes.
Assume there is one variable (in the short run) input L. The profitmaximizing monopolist employs the input up to the point at which
p(l - 1)MPL

=

(2)

w(l + I).
eL

ed

In this equation, MP L is the marginal product of the input factor, w is
the price of the input, and eL is the elasticity of supply for the input.
In the perfectly competitive case, the value of the input's marginal
product is equal to the input price (i.e., pMPL = w). In the dual market
power scenario shown in equation (2), the output price is above the
competitive level, reflecting the exploitation of output market power,
and the input price is below the competitive level, reflecting exploitation of input market power.
Using the familiar Lerner index as a measure of market power
exploitation, in the standard output market monopoly case

p-MC
M
L=p

1

(3)

ed

The monopolist's ability to exploit its power is inversely related to the
point elasticity of demand at its profit-maximizing output level. In
the dual (input and output) market monopoly case, the equivalent
version of the Lerner index is
L P- MC
p

ed + eL

ed(eL + 1)

18

For the derivation of equation (4), see Keith N. Hylton & Mark Lasser,
MeasuringMarket Power When the Firm Has Power in the Input and Output Markets,
18

131-39, in

ECONOMIC INPUTS, LEGAL OUTPUTS: THE ROLES OF THE ECONOMISTS IN
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If the firm has market power in the input market, but no market
power in the output market, the dual market power Lerner index simplifies to:
(5)

1
(eL + 1)

which implies that the firm is more effective at exploiting the input
market if ed > e L +1 (evaluated at the profit-maximizing quantities).
Thus, if given a choice, the firm might prefer to exploit its input market rather than its output market.
Notice that the dual market power Lerner index can be decomposed as follows:

ed

+

1

eL+l

1

(6)

e(e+l)

which is the sum of the Lerner indexes for the output monopolist and
the input monopsonist with an interaction term (equal to the product
of the two single power indexes) subtracted off. The dual market
power firm does not go as far in exploiting its power in either market
as would the pure monopolist or the pure monopsonist. To do so
would generate the familiar "double marginalization" inefficiency
that is observed when successive monopolists interact." The firm
wisely takes into account the fact that a cut in output will also lead to
some surplus recoupment in the input market and therefore cuts output less aggressively than does the pure monopolist.
Even though the dual market monopolist cuts output less aggressively than does the pure monopolist, the harmful welfare effects of
its exploitation are more severe. Since L, is greater than L, the effective
ANTITRUST (Fred S. McChesney ed., 1998). For an alternative
approach using the Lerner index, see Roger D. Blair & Jeffrey L. Harrison, The
MODERN

Measurement of Monopsony Power, 37 ANTITRUST BULL. 133 (1992).
1 Joseph J. Spengler, Vertical Integration and Antitrust Policy, 58 J. POL.
EcON. 347 (1950).
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price wedge relative to competition is greater in the dual market
power case than in the single market monopoly case.
Implicationsfor predation

B.

We can use the foregoing results on monopoly pricing and the
Lerner index to compare the welfare implications of output market
and input market predation. In addition, the comparative implications for consumer welfare offer insights on the proper legal standards for predation in output and input markets.
First, the monopoly pricing results confirm the Court's suggestion
that a firm may engage in input market predation in order to achieve
monopsony power even if the firm sells in a perfectly competitive
output market. 20 In the case in which the output market is perfectly
competitive, the elasticity of demand for the firm's output (ed) will be
infinite, so it will not be able profitably to set its output price above
the competitive level. However, if the firm can acquire monopsony
power, it will be able to gain by pushing the input price below the
competitive level after achieving monopsony, and this provides an
incentive to the firm to engage in input market predation even when
the output market is competitive.
Second, the monopoly pricing results imply that when input market predation is part of a strategy to achieve dominance in the output
market, the welfare costs of input market predation are greater than
those of output market predation. The reason for this is that input
predation, when used successfully as a part of a strategy to achieve an
output market monopoly, results in dual market power. Other things
being equal, dual market monopoly is more harmful to welfare than
simple output monopoly. This conclusion follows from the fact that
the Lerner index for the dual market monopolization case is larger
than the Lerner index for the single market standard monopolization
case, which implies that the wedge between the firm's price and the
competitive price is greater in the dual market power setting.
Putting these two observations together, we arrive at a somewhat
different position from that taken by the Supreme Court in Weyer-

Weyerhaeuser, 127 S. Ct. at 1078.
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haeuser. The Court could not see a persuasive reason to view input
market predation as more harmful to consumers than output market
predation. The implication of my analysis is that input market predation is distinguishable on welfare grounds from output market predation. In particular, input market predation, when it has the potential
to enhance output market dominance, is likely to be more harmful to
consumer welfare than is the standard case of output market predation. And since input predation will often have the potential to
enhance output market power, it seems reasonable to view input predation as especially worrisome.
It should be clear that the Brooke Group standard needs to be modified in the input predation scenario, since a firm may have an incentive to engage in input market predation even when the output
market is competitive. The dangerous probability prong of the Brooke
Group standard should examine the prospects to achieve monopsony
power in the input market as well as monopoly power in the output
market. Although the Court did not say this explicitly in
Weyerhaeuser, this is implicit in its discussion of the dangerous probability test.
The bigger question is whether the "basic economic analysis" of
the preceding part implies that the Brooke Group test should be
replaced by a test that is more favorable to plaintiffs in the input market predation scenario. I will explore this in more detail below.
V.

ERROR COSTS AND THE PREDATION STANDARD

A. Inadequacy of incentives analysis
The basic economic analysis suggests, contrary to the Court's view,
that input market predation is distinguishable from output market
predation in terms of its welfare effects, and that those effects imply
that input market predation tends to be more costly to consumer welfare. One might argue that this supports the Ninth Circuit's view that
the Brooke Group standard is inappropriate for input predation.
It does not follow immediately, however, from the observation
that input market predation is potentially more harmful than output
market predation that the standard of Brooke Group should be altered
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to permit plaintiffs to pursue predation claims more easily. The case
for the Brooke Group standard is not based solely on an examination of
the economic incentives for predation. It is based largely on "error
cost" considerations.
Under the error cost (or decision theoretic) approach, the standard
in Brooke Group is justified in light of the relative costs of false convictions and false acquittals. In the output market predation context,
false acquittals leave a dominant firm intact and unregulated by the
antitrust laws. That firm, however, is still subject to competitive pressures that regulate its freedom to exploit its market power.' On the
other hand, false convictions for predatory pricing punish firms for
making competitive decisions that are essential for a competitive
economy to function. If firms worry about the risk of punishment
every time they cut their prices, price cuts will be observed less often
and consumers will suffer.
These arguments, as the Court noted in Weyerhaeuser, remain
valid in the case of bidding for inputs. There are procompetitive
instances in which a firm may outbid its rivals for access to an input.
The law would discourage competition in this sphere if it were to
punish firms in those instances. The exclusion of cases in which the
bidding firm is able to outbid rivals profitably, which the Court
adopted as part of the price-cost test of Brooke Group," is a useful way
to avoid punishing firms in instances of efficient outbidding.
Hence, although basic economic analysis implies that input predation is potentially more harmful to consumer welfare than is output market predation, and therefore provides some support to the
Ninth Circuit's decision, the Brooke Group standard remains justifiable in the context of input market predation when error costs are
taken into account. The mere fact that the welfare harms are likely to
be greater in the context of input predation is insufficient, by itself, to
support the conclusion that the Brooke Group standard should be
modified in favor of plaintiffs in cases of input market predation. In
particular, the first prong of the Brooke Group standard, which
21

22

Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1 (1984).
Weyerhaeuser, 127 S. Ct. at 1078.
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requires the exclusion of cases in which the bidding firm outbids
rivals profitably, may still be the best approach in light of the costs of
false convictions.
A special case of the dual market power setting that could require
modification of the first prong of the Brooke Group test arises when the
predator begins with market power in the output market and uses
predatory bidding to gain monopsony power in the input market.
This is the dual market power acquisition scenario in reverse order. In
this case, the first prong of the Brooke Group test could fail to serve as a
useful screen for separating procompetitive and anticompetitive
instances of bidding. If the firm has power in the output market, the
first stage outcome might be one in which the firm's output price
increases during the predatory bidding phase. This might occur
because: (1) the firm's marginal cost actually increases as a consequence of bidding up the input price,' or (2) because the firm strategically increases its output price in order to evade detection under the
first prong of the Brooke Group test. In light of this possibility, courts
should recognize that when the firm has the ability to increase its output price during the predatory bidding phase, the first prong of the
test should not be rigidly applied.24
Consider the second prong of the Brooke Group standard, the dangerous probability requirement, in light of the basic economic analysis
and in light of error costs. The second prong of Brooke Group has
required an examination of market structure and competition in the
relevant market. In the case of input market predation, examination of
the output market alone will be insufficient as a screen on case quality. The reason is that a firm may have an incentive to engage in input
market predation even when the output market is competitive.
23
One can distinguish different input predation scenarios. One is the
lump sum transfercase, in which the predator pays a lump sum to purchase a
stock of inputs or to pay off a supplier. Another is spot market premium case, in
which the bidder pays a higher price for every unit of the input during the
predation phase. These scenarios, and perhaps others, need to be distinguished in a careful analysis of the consequences of predatory bidding.
24
Blair and Lopatka discuss this scenario and argue that a profit sacrifice test should be applied to the monopolist's actions. Blair & Lopatka, supra
note 6.
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In order to avoid the outcome in which the dangerous probability
requirement is meaningless as a constraint, courts should interpret
the dangerous probability test to require an examination of market
structure and competition in both the input and output markets. If
both markets are vulnerable to monopolization, then the likelihood
that the firm's conduct involved real predation should be viewed as
considerably higher than in other scenarios.
To sum up, while basic economic analysis suggests specific ways
in which the Brooke Group standard should be fine tuned to apply to
input market predation, it is insufficient to justify a decision to replace
Brooke Group with some alternative standard that is more favorable to
plaintiffs in the input predation scenario. Given that false convictions
can occur in the input predation scenario, and that they can be costly
as well, a stronger case must be offered for jettisoning Brooke Group
than that suggested by the economic analysis of predation incentives.
I am concerned, however, that the Court has not provided a worthy account of the procompetitive benefits of outbidding rivals in the
input market. Neither has the Court provided as much detail as it
should have in the application of the Brooke Group standard to input
markets. I will consider both questions in the remaining parts.
B. Information and prices
Recall that the Court suggested four procompetitive justifications
for the outbidding of rivals for access to inputs: (1) mistakes, (2) differentiated impacts of product market demand shocks, (3) greater productive efficiency on the part of the dominant firm, and (4) hedging against
risk. The Court offered these justifications as reasons why conduct that
appears to be input predation might be either unavoidable consequences of competition or beneficial to the economy and to consumers.
At least three of the four justifications offered by the Court are
based on information. If you read the Court's list of justifications and
ask why each one might explain why one firm profitably outbids
another, the most likely explanation in each case is informational
asymmetry. This is obviously so in the case of overbidding mistakes,
which are a function of the allocation of information across market
participants.
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Suppose firm A outbids firm B because it is hedging against the
risk of a future shortage of inputs. Why should firm B be outbid on
this basis? The shortage will affect both firms in the same way. The
most likely reason for any difference in bids is that firm A possesses
different predictions on the future availability of inputs than does
firm B. Those predictions are likely to be based on information collected by firm A that firm B does not have. Of course, firm A might
outbid firm B on the basis of incorrect information.
If market demand shocks affect firms differently, that is likely to be
the result of information differences. Some firms will know about the
market demand shocks and others may not know. Alternatively, some
firms may understand the implications of the market demand shocks
better than other firms. Even if products are differentiated, information is probably the key reason demand shocks might affect firms differently in their bidding for inputs. For example, suppose two firms
offer differentiated products on the output market while bidding for
the same input. Suppose an exogenous change in consumer tastes, say
due to immigration, increases the demand for one firm's product relative to the other's. This may lead the in-demand firm to outbid its rival
(out-of-demand firm) for inputs. But, in this scenario, the inputs have
actually increased in value by the extent of the in-demand firm's new
bids. The only reason the out-of-demand firm might be outbid is
because it cannot afford to pay the new market price, in which case its
exclusion from access to inputs is efficient, or because it cannot
observe or predict the new market value of the inputs.
These examples suggest an especially important feature of markets that is easy to overlook in the predation context. Prices are signals and stores of information. 2 Whenever antitrust law disrupts the
market processes by which prices are established, it threatens to
obstruct a core function of the market.
The Court recognizes the importance of price setting in the competitive process. In Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc.,26 the Court referred to competitive pricing as the "central
On prices and information, see F.A. Hayek, The Use of Knowuledge in
Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV. 519 (1945).

441 U.S. 1 (1979).
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nervous system of the economy" and suggested that the per se rule
should not be applied unless the challenged agreement threatens that
system.27 This protective view of the role of competitive pricing
appears to play some role in the Court's predatory pricing case law.
The Brooke Group standard is based in part on the concern that false
convictions that discourage price cutting decisions would be especially
costly because of the importance of those decisions to competition.
The Court's argument in Weyerhaeuser fails to get across any sense
that decisions to bid up prices, just as decisions to cut prices, play a
role in the central nervous system of an economy. Prices are bid up
when supply fails to meet demand at preexisting prices. A law that
threatens punishment on a market actor who bids prices up would
have undesirable consequences.
Prices convey information. While the simple textbook analysis of
market prices tells us that prices are bid up so that supply can meet
demand, there is an underlying question of who knows when supply
is insufficient to meet demand. When supplies have to be generated
in advance of the actual transfer to buyers, who knows when future
supply will be unable to meet future demand? Government bureaucrats, lawyers, and economists are not the ones who know. Market
participants, who have a direct stake in finding the answers, are the
ones who discover when supply is unlikely to meet demand. The
price system permits those actors to gain by taking advantage of this
information and purchasing inputs, bidding up their prices. The price
increases convey information to suppliers that induces them to bring
forth greater supply to the market.
The biggest gains for bidding up prices will go to those who discover and act first on information suggesting that current or future
supply may be insufficient to meet demand. The price system
rewards those who are best suited to finding information or predicting shortages or excesses of supply. The first one to act bids on inputs
before any information of an upcoming shortage has affected prices.
When the information begins to spread and input prices rise, the first
actor earns the greatest profits from having acted early. In this way,
the price system encourages those who are most efficient at discover27

Id. at 23.
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ing information on market conditions to act on that information
promptly, thereby communicating their information to the market.
The ability of these actors to gain from acting on their private information ensures that their information will be revealed, rather than sat
upon and ignored.
Antitrust has not given sufficient weight to the informational role
of prices. The tendency of antitrust courts to focus on price cutting as
a means of enhancing consumer welfare has taken them away from
thinking about the function of prices as signals and conveyors of private information.
I have set out my description of pricing as information in the context of input bidding, but the argument applies to output price setting
as well. One could argue that when a firm sets a price for its product,
it is also conveying information about what it thinks the market will
bear. This argument implies that some instances of alleged predation
may reflect the dominant firm's assessment that the demand for its
product will decline, leading it to cut prices in the present in order to
maintain its customer base in future periods.
While it is true that the information-conveyance view of price setting applies to output pricing as well as to bidding for inputs, the
argument seems especially applicable to the input bidding case. The
relationship between information and prices is different in the input
bidding and output pricing scenarios.
In the input bidding scenario, the bidding firm does not have
direct control over the supply or quantity of the input on the market.
This lack of control is obvious when the bidding firm is not a monopsonist. In contrast, when the bidding firm has monopsony power, it
enjoys some degree of control over the quantity of the input. But even
in the monopsony setting, the bidding firm still has far less than
direct control. The input supplier can always refuse to accept the
monopsonist's price. For example, in a monopsonized labor market,
the workers could always form a union and convert the monopsony
setting into one of bilateral monopoly.
In the absence of direct control over the quantity of the input, the
bidding firm is always in the position of having to be concerned
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about its access to the input. If access to the input is not guaranteed,
the bidding firm will have to predict future supply and demand conditions in order to avoid being "caught out" without access to the
input. This means that bidding firms have incentives to monitor input
markets and collect information on them. The potential scarcity of the
input offers a reward to the bidding seller who best predicts the
future state of the input market-e.g., whether a shortage or excess
appears.
The situation is different for the dominant firm that must determine how to price its own output. The dominant firm seller has direct
control over its own quantity. As long as it has access to its inputs and
its production process functions, the dominant firm does not confront
the risk of being caught out without access to its own product.
Since the risk of being shut down is higher in the input bidding
than in the output pricing scenario, the incentive to monitor and to
collect information on market conditions is greater in the input bidding scenario. As a result, the connection between information and
bidding is probably a bit stronger in the input bidding scenario than
in the output-price setting scenario.
The error cost framework of Brooke Group is incomplete because it
does not explicitly incorporate the informational role of prices. This
informational role is especially important in the input bidding scenario. It follows that in thinking about the costs of false convictions
for predation, courts should attempt to consider the effects a legal
standard governing predation might have on incentives to convey
information to markets. Moreover, if one had to identify the central
nervous system of the economy, it is most likely to be found in the
information role of pricing rather than in the benefits received by consumers from short-run price cutting.
C. Some implicationsfor the Weyerhaeuser analysis
The Court's analysis in Weyerhaeuser is based in part on the rather
weak argument that ultimate consumers may not be harmed by input
market predation and that therefore there may be no need to regulate
such predation in order to protect consumers. This is not the best
choice from the menu of possible arguments, for several reasons.
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First, the Court's decision to focus on ultimate consumers rather
than suppliers of inputs, as beneficiaries of input predation, may turn
out to be a regrettable decision in the long run. If one focuses on suppliers of inputs, one sees that the benefits to those suppliers are
entirely analogous to the benefits to ultimate consumers from output
price predation. Explicitly recognizing this analogy in the text of the
Court's argument (rather than in a single footnote) would have made
the argument for the Brooke Group standard a bit more persuasive, and
aided lower courts in analyzing problems such as this.28
Second, the Court's claim that consumers might not be harmed by
successful input market predation is questionable. If the input market
predation is successful, it will result in some reduction in supply from
the monopsony firm-since a monopsonist uses less than the competitive quantity of the monopsonized input. That cutback in supply will
reduce consumer welfare, though the effect may be small.2 9
Third, even if the negative effect of input predation on ultimate
consumers is trivial, this is hardly an argument in favor of enforcement passivity. The Court's argument, examined closely, is really this:
in some cases, input market predation harms consumers greatly; in
others, it harms them not much at all. To focus on the "not much at
all" case as a reason for enforcement passivity is unpersuasive.
28
Indeed, as Blair and Lopatka explain, supra note 6, at 37, one can read
at least one Supreme Court decision, Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. Am.
Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219 (1948), as explicitly recognizing the Sherman
Act's protection of the producers surplus earned by suppliers in a competitive market. The Court could have easily cited Mandeville Island Farms as a
basis for treating the gains to suppliers during the first stage of a predatory
bidding campaign as analogous to the gains to buyers in the first stage of a
predatory pricing campaign.
-9 This conclusion contradicts that reached in Salop, supra note 6, at 673.
Although the predatory firm may purchase more of the input during the
predatory campaign (and even this is not clear, since the predatory firm
might simply pay a higher price without purchasing a greater quantity), this
strikes me to be a short-run consideration. In the long term, the successful
predator gains monopsony power, which is harmful to the welfare of suppliers and of consumers, though the effect on consumers may be small. For similar points, see Richard 0. Zerbe, Jr., Monopsony and the Ross-Simmons Case: A
Comment on Salop and Kirkwood, 72 ANTITRUST L. J. 717 (2005).
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As I have suggested, the "basic economics" case for enforcement
passivity in the input predation setting is weak. Input predation
appears, on the basis of an economic analysis of predation incentives,
to be at least as harmful as output market predation and potentially
more harmful. The Court would aid the reasoning of lower courts by
recognizing these implications of economic analysis.
The argument for applying the Brooke Group standard to input
predation is, in the end, not closely connected to basic economic
analysis. The argument is mostly based on the error cost framework.
And it is at this stage where it appears that the argument in favor of
the Brooke Group standard is at least as strong, and perhaps stronger,
than in the case of output market predation.
Input pricing is an important part of the economy's central nervous system. In most instances, it takes place in open competitive markets, and reflects bidders' information on the scarcity of inputs. In
order for markets in inputs to function, these bids must communicate
information relatively quickly. An antitrust rule that threatens punishment to firms that act quickly to bid up input prices poses a threat to
well-ordered markets.
VI. RECONCILING WEYERHAEUSER
WITH LABOR ANTITRUST
There is a line of cases involving input market predation
known as labor antitrust cases. These are cases in which a union
forms an agreement with an employer or group of employers that
has the effect of obstructing competition among the employers."
Labor is an input into production, and it is by far the most common example of predation in input markets. In some of the cases,
the Court has found an antitrust violation. It would have been
helpful for the Court to explain the differences between these cases
and Weyerhaeuser.
10 For a discussion of the economics of labor antitrust cases, see Oliver E.
Williamson, Wage Rates as a Barrierto Entry: The Pennington Case in Perspective,
82 Q. J. ECON. 85 (1968); Keith N. Hylton, Efficiency and Labor Law, 87 Nw. U.
L. REV. 471, 520-22 (1993).

WEYERHAEUSER

: 71

Consider United Mine Workers v. Pennington." The United Mine
Workers made an agreement with one set of employers to set wages
at levels that would be prohibitively expensive for competing
nonunion employers.2 The wage agreement was set with the purpose
of driving less efficient competitors out of the market.3 The Court had
to determine whether the antitrust laws applied to such an agreement
or whether it fell under the labor exemption to antitrust. The Court
held that the antitrust laws applied, affirming a lower court finding
that the agreement violated the antitrust laws.'
If we step back and look at the most general features of Pennington, it looks a lot like the plaintiff's version of the events in Weyerhaeuser. In Pennington, one group of employers (buyers) made a
labor agreement (purchase agreement) that set the wage (price of the
input) at a level that would bankrupt rival employers (competing
input buyers). The Court did not adopt a high barrier of the sort
articulated in Brooke Group for the plaintiffs in Pennington. Of course,
Pennington preceded Brooke Group, but the Court has never suggested that the Brooke Group standard should be applied to a case
like Pennington. Is this an instance in which similar cases are being
treated differently, or are there differences between Weyerhaeuser and
Pennington?
In fact there are important differences, and it may help to clarify
the case for or against applying the Brooke Group standard to input
predation by considering the differences. First, the labor antitrust
cases such as Pennington involve explicit conspiracies. Antitrust law
has applied more plaintiff-favorable standards to conspiracies, and
this is widely considered to be justified by the error cost rationale provided long ago by the Court in Trenton Potteries."
.1 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
32

Id. at 660.

33 Id.
34

Id. at 668.

United States v. Trenton Potteries, 273 U.S. 392 (1927). Trenton Potteries
provides the error cost rationale for the per se illegality rule governing price
fixing.
35
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Setting aside the distinction between conspiracy and unilateral
conduct, it is possible to identify other ways in which the type of predation in Pennington differs from the predation alleged in Weyerhaeuser. In the labor antitrust setting, the union has the power to
control the supply of labor inputs. This level of control over the market for inputs is not observed in Weyerhaeuser.
Consider an example in which there are two input buyers (A and
B) and two input suppliers (C and D). Suppose A attempts to bid the
price of the input up to a level that would bankrupt B. Unless there is
an agreement between input suppliers C and D, one of them would
have an incentive to sell excess inputs (inputs that will not be purchased by A) to B at a discount. In addition, the excessive bids offered
by A will tempt other input sellers to enter the market. Predation is
unlikely to be successful under these conditions.
Suppose, however, C and D form an iron-clad agreement to sell at
the same price, which is the level determined by A's excessive bids.
Suppose also that C and D can effectively block entry by competing
input suppliers by withholding inputs to any firm that purchases
inputs from any other supplier. This scenario is a closer fit to the facts
of Pennington.
In Pennington the agreement between the union and the employer
led to the elimination of less efficient firms. If this is viewed under the
Brooke Group standard, as applied to input predation, then the pricecost test would not be satisfied. In other words, Brooke Group requires
the plaintiff to show that the input predation led to a period in which
marginal cost was driven above price for the predator firm. But this is
not the case in Pennington because the agreement was designed to
eliminate only the less efficient firms. Still, Pennington involved a conspiracy, which could justify treating the case differently from one of
unilateral conduct.
Suppose the agreement in Penningtonhad been designed to eliminate equally efficient firms. Then the first prong of the Brooke Group
standard, as applied to input predation, would be satisfied. The second prong of the standard, the dangerous probability requirement,
would probably be satisfied too. The reason is that the union in Pennington had the power to block the entry of competing input suppli-
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ers. The predatory scheme in Pennington would permit the predating
firm to eliminate competitors and to remain in the market relatively
free from the threat of entry by competitors.
Pennington permits us to construct a hypothetical case in which
the Brooke Group standard would most likely be satisfied. By using
such examples to distinguish and defend the decision in Weyerhaeuser,
the Court could have provided useful guidance for lower courts and
answered the critique that the Brooke Group standard is essentially a
per se legality rule.
VII. CONCLUSION
There is a rigorous basis for concluding that predatory bidding
and predatory pricing are analytically distinct, as the Ninth Circuit
did when it rejected the Brooke Group standard in Weyerhaeuser. The
incentive to engage in predation, as measured by the potential
reward, is greater in the bidding context than in the pricing context.
Predatory bidding may lead to a dual market power outcome in
which the predator has market power in both the input and the output market. The welfare costs of dual market monopoly are greater
than those of single market monopoly.
However, the core rationale for the Brooke Group standard is based
more on error cost considerations than on an economic analysis of
incentives to engage in predation. False convictions are potentially
costly to society in their effects on information transmission in bidding markets. There is no obvious reason to believe that false conviction costs in bidding markets are any less worrisome than false
conviction costs in output markets.

